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Abstract 
The paper investigates pollution control of firms engaging in imperfect 
competition. We consider asymmetric Cournot duopoly where firms have 
linear technologies. Welfare is assumed to be separable in consumers' surplus 
and social damage which is given by a convex function depending on the 
aggregate pollution level. After deriving social optimum, we give a complete 
characterization of the optimal linear tax as well as of the optimal number of 
permits taking into account the firms' strategic behavior, and then compare 
the two both policies with respect to welfare. None of them turns out to 
implement social optimum in general. Also, no policy can be said to be 
superior. for all parameters. However, for a considerable range of parameters 
giving out permits yields a higher welfare than taxes. Finally, we consider 
double taxation of output and pollutants. In this case social optimum can
always be achieved, if there are only two firms. 
Permits or Taxes? How to Regulate Cournot 
Duopoly with Polluting Firms 
Till Requate* 
1 Introduction
In order to reduce the aggregate output of pollutants, in practice, most governments 
or jurisdictions just impose uniform standards of pollution levels on the firms. From 
economic theory we know for almost 30 years that there are more efficient tools than
that, like charging Pigouvian taxes on pollutants or to give out a number of marketable 
permits for pollutants. It is well known that under certain assumptions both regimes 
are equivalent and yield the socially efficient outcome if the optimal Pigouvian tax is 
charged or the optimal number of permits is given out (for an exposition see for example 
BAUMOL and OATES [2]). For this results to hold it is necessary to assume that the
government has complete information about the industry's aggregate abatement cost as 
well as about the social damage which is assumed to depend only on aggregate emissions. 
Moreover, it has to be assumed that the polluting firms supply their marketable output 
on a competitive market and also behave as price takers on the market for permits if
there is any. SPULBER [14] demonstrates that under these assumptions taxes or permits
are also optimal in the long run if the number of firms is determined endogenously. 
Under incomplete information about aggregate abatement cost and damage, either 
of both tools can yield a higher welfare, contingent on the ratio of slopes of marginal 
abatement cost and marginal social damage as Weitzman showed. Further approaches 
on incomplete information have been pursued by ROBERTS and SPENCE [11] and also
by IfWEREL-fi']-,-wlrO"·propose· a·mixture of measures· consisting of .. permits, taxes and 
*University of Bielefeld, Germany. This paper has been written for the most part during a visit to 
California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California. The author would like to express his gratitude to 
the Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences for its hospitality, to P. Chander and the participants 
of seminars in Pasadena and Bielefeld for their helpful comments, and especially to Jeanne Netzley for 
her '1£X-nical support. 
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subsidies on abatement. All these models are partial analyses where firms are assumed 
to behave as price takers.1 
Very few has been worked on how to regulate polluting firms which engage in imper­
fect competition, that is, have market power on either market. HAHN [6] studies a model 
where one big firm has market power on the market of permits, the remaining firms be­
have as price takers. He shows that the final allocation of permits depends on the initial 
allocation and will be inefficient in general. MALUEG [8] considers the distribution of
permits in a Cournot oligopoly on the output market, however, without explicitly consid­
ering the "pollution technology". In a recent paper, EBERT [4] investigates taxation of a
symmetric Cournot oligopoly with polluting firms. In that special case, social optimum
can be implemented by a suitable Pigouvian tax. However, the analysis of imperfect 
competition starts to become interesting if firms have different technologies, otherwise
uniform standards would work quite all right. 
According to my knowledge, asymmetric oligopoly models, where the output market 
as well as the pollution sector -i.e. the market for permits if there is any - are treated 
simultaneously have not been analyzed so far. The reason may be that probably few can 
be said under fairly general assumptions. Hence, in this paper, an asymmetric duopoly 
model with special, but not unrealistic technologies will be set up. Each of two firms 
owns a linear or Leontief technology, that is, it faces constant marginal cost and produces 
a pollutant proportional to the output of the marketable commodity. We pursue partial 
analysis for one marketable commodity and assume that a certain pollutant will be gen­
erated by this industry only. (Partial) social welfare is additively separable in consumers' 
surplus, social damage of pollutant and production cost. The government has complete 
information about market demand, social damage and about the two technologies, but 
does not necessarily know what firm owns what technology. After deriving the social 
optimum, we give a complete characterization of the optimal linear tax as well as the 
optimal number of permits, taking into account the firms' strategic behavior on the out­
put market as well as on the market for permits if there is one. It will turn out that the 
optimal (linear) tax will be nondecreasing as a function of a damage parameters, which 
determines the slope of marginal damage. For low s the Pigouvian tax will be negative. 
So, if social damage from pollution is low, pollution will be subsidized in order to increase 
output, a result in accordance with [4]. The optimal number of permits, on the other 
hand, is nonincreasing ins, downward jumping for some value of s, and constant on some 
interval for s. Both regimes do in general not implement the first best solution if firms are
different, especially not when both firms are active. Moreover, none of the two policies 
can be said to be superior to the other, in terms of welfare. Both policies may yield 
social optimum, allowing only the less polluting firm to produce, if social damage from 
pollution is sufficiently high. Under the permit regime, however, the social optimum is 
achieved for a greater range of parameters for which it is socially desirable that only the 
"cleaner" firm produces. This yields an argument in favor of permits under imperfect 
1There is much more literature on taxes and permits under price taking behavior, which we cannot 
all give credit here. For an excellent overview of different kinds of permit trading see TIETENBERG 's 
book [17]. 
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competition if social damage is high. For very low social damage from pollution, the 
permit regime turns out to be undesirable since the lower cost firm exploits the regime 
by buying all the permits and exercises monopoly power. For intermediate values of the 
social damage parameter, few can be said in general. Recently, H. SIEBERT, president of
the Institut fuer Weltwirtschaft, argued in a magazine's interview in favor of permits by 
explaining its idea by the example of power plants: the modern power plant buys all the 
permits from the odd one, compensating it for closing down. This paper supports his 
argument in the case that the odd firm is sufficiently worse or social damage is sufficiently 
high (and the corresponding number of permits is low), however, not for all values of s 
for which it is socially desirable that the worse pol uter closes down!
In this duopoly model, the inefficiency arising from the two policies, can be removed 
by taxing both, output and pollutants. In that case, it is easy to show that social
optimum can always be implemented. This result, however, does certainly not generalize 
to nonlinear technologies and to more than two firms. 
The paper is organized as follows: In the following section we set up the model. 
Section 3 characterizes the social optimum. In section 4 we briefly discuss the underlying
information structure for the tax and the permit regime. In sections 5 and 6 we develop
the optimal linear tax, and the optimal number of permits, respectively. In section 7 
we compare the two regimes and give a numerical example. Section 8 deals with double 
taxation of output and emissions. The last section concludes. Unless stated otherwise 
all formal proofs are given in the appendix. 
2 The Basic Model 
Throughout this paper we will consider a Cournot duopoly with firms i = 1, 2 setting
quantities qi, q2. The price is determined by an inverse demand function P, with P' < 0, 
which depends on aggregate output Q = qi + q2• We assume there is a finite choke-off
price p := P(O) := min{p[D(p) := p-1(p) = 0}. For various reasons, we further make
Assumption 1 
2P'(Q)JQ. 
[P"[ is sufficiently bounded; in particular: for all Q > 0: P"(Q) <
The upper boundfor P" is sufficient to guarantee the.second orcier conditions for profit
maximization of monopoly as well as for the duopolistic firm in Cournot-Nash equilib­
rium. It is also sufficient to guarantee uniqueness of Nash-equilibrium. 2
Both firms have constant marginal costs c1 and c2, with (w.l.o.g.) ci :<::: c2 < p. 
Production is not possible without pollution. Producing q; units of output, firm i pro-
2Later on, we also need that P is not too concave. To quantify the lower bound, however, yields 
tedious expressions and does not yield further insight. 
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duces e; = d;q; units of emissions. This cost and pollution structure may be considered
stemming from a linear (Leontief-)technology. Firms do not have an abatement technol­
ogy. 3 Total emissions are written E := e1 + e2• To evaluate utility and harm of (q1, q2) 
(which determines (e1, e2) ) to the society, we assume to have a partial social welfare
function W(qi, q2).4 In the absence of pollution, in the industrial economics literature,
a social welfare is simply taken as W(q1,q2) = f0Q P(z)dz - c1q1 - c2q2, that is, con­
sumers' gross surplus minus aggregate production costs.5 We will extend this approach 
by assuming that benefit from production and damage from pollution are additively sep­
arable. This means, in addition to consumers' surplus there is a social damage function 
S: 'Ill+ x IR+ ---+IR+ with (E,s) i-; -s(E,s), which depends on aggregate emissions E
and a damage parameters. Employing the usual notation S1(E,s) := as��,s) and so on,
we make the following assumption. 
Assumption 2 o) S is at least twice continuously differentiable with respect to6 E and 
s; in (0, 0) the right sided partial derivatives exist. 
i) S (O,s) = 0 Vs 2 0,
ii) S(E,O) = 0 VE 2 0,
iii) S1(E, s) 2 0 Vs> 0 and strictly greater for E > 0.
iv) S11(E,s) 2 0 Vs> 0 and strictly greater for E > 0.
v) S12(E,s) > 0 VE> O,s > 0.
So, S is increasing and convex in E and marginal damage increases ins. Although s is an
exogenous parameter of the model, parameterizing S via s allows us to characterize social
optimum and also regulatory policies as a function of the damage function's steepness. 
Finally we assume: 
Assumption 3 The pollutant resulting from production of the industry's output, only 
arises in this industry. 
Assumption 3 does not hold in all industries, of course. For example C02, is generated
by many different industries. S02, on the other hand, is generated basically by power
plants. Also in the chemical industry, some poisonous pollutants are generated from 
3 Assuming the firms to have an abatement technology allowing them to reduce pollution by investing 
some effort, which in turn generates a higher cost, screws up the linearity of the cost function. Then 
we could ·start-immetliately·with·some- cost-function C(q;e)-which ·is'1lon1inear in output and emissions. 
This is certainly worth to pursue and should be tackled by further research. However, much less can be 
derived in general, as far as I can see. 
4We call it partial since we neglect income effects and externalities on other markets. 
5This is equivalent to W(qi, q2) = f0Q P(z)dz - P(Q) · Q + (P(Q)q1 - c1q1) + (P(Q)q2 - c2q2), that 
is, net consumers' surplus plus profits of the firms. Some authors use the latter, and sometimes even 
multiply surplus and profits with different weights (see for example BARON and MEYERSON [l]). Then, 
however, the two concepts are not equivalent. 
6For short: "w.r.t." in the remainder. 
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production of one certain commodity. Since we want to analyze regulation of firms under 
imperfect competition, Assumption 3 is crucial to make the analysis interesting.
Assuming separability of social welfare in consumers' surplus, production cost, and 
social damage, the welfare function is given by 
(2.1) 
Without any kind of regulation, Cournot competition leads to a Cournot-N ash equilib­
rium independently of s. By Assumption 1 there is always a unique equilibrium for all
constant marginal costs c1, c2 < p .  
Before turning to regulatory policies, let us derive the social optimum a fictive social 
planner would install under complete information. If c1 < c2, it is clear that for s = 0
the higher cost firm 2 should not produce anything. If social damage is very high, one
could think that only the firm with the relatively lower pollution level per unit of output 
should operate, that is, with the smaller d;. However, it is not quite like this. What will
turn out to be crucial is whether the term (d1c2 - d2c1)/(d1 - d2) is greater than the
choke-off price or not, or equivalently, what the sign is of dif (p- c1) - d2f (p- c2), which
is the difference between the firms' ratio of marginal pollution and maximal marginal 
consumers' surplus. For convenience, we write for short Ci. := d1(p - c2) - d2(p - c1) for
the remainder of the paper. 
3 The social optimum 
The social planner has to solve the following program: 
(3.1) 
s. t. qi 2'. 0, q2 2'. 0.
The following proposition yields the properties of the optimal solution (remember 
that we assumed c1 :::; c2): 
Proposition 3.1 a) If Ci. :::; 0, firm 2 never produces for all s > 0, unless c1 - c2
di = d2, and firm 1 produces q which solves 
P(q) = c1 + S1(d1q, s)d1 (3.2)
q is decreasing in s. (If both firms are alike, clearly q may be arbitrarily distributed on 
both firms}. 
5 
b) If� > 0, there are parameters§.< = and s::::; <Xl (< <Xl for d2 > 0) with§. < s,
such that the solution of (3.1) is characterized by
and Q = q1 is decreasing in s. 
qi> 0 }
q2 = 0
and q1 is decreasing, q2 is increasing, and Q = q1 + q2 is constant in s. 
and Q = q2 is decreasing in s. 
v s ;:::: s if d2 > 0,
Moreover, Q, E, and W are continuous, E and W are decreasing ins. 
Thus, we can say that firm one has the better technology if � ::::; 0, unless c1 = c2, 
d1 = d2 when production can be arbitrarily shared by both firms. Notice that c1 < c2 
and d1 = d2 as well as c1 = c2 and d1 < d2 imply � ::::; 0. But notice also that � ::::; 0 may
hold for some d1 > d2 if c1 is sufficiently smaller than c2. In other words, even if firm 2
emits less pollutants per unit of output, it may never produce in social optimum if the 
cost differential c2 - c1 is sufficiently high.
Proposition 3.1 is derived by solving (3.1 ) , taking into account the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions with respect to the constraints q1 ;:::: 0 and q2 ;:::: 0. Details are relegated to the
appendix. Notice that c1 ::::; c2 and�> 0 imply d1 > d2, that is, firm 2 emits strictly less
pollutants per unit of output than firm 1. Interestingly, for §. ::::; s ::::; s aggregate output
is constant ins and equals Q = �/(d1 - d2). Thus, the social planner shifts production
continuously from firm 1 to firm 2 ass increases, keeping total output constant, until firm 
1, which faces the lower production cost but is the worse polluter, shuts down. These 
properties are displayed in figure 1. 
Figure 1 about here. 
4 Regulatory Policies: Some Remarks on the In­
formation Structure 
Needless to say that first best solutions are in general not enforceable by prescribing 
the firms to produce individually different quantities. Not only is there an information 
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problem in the sense that the government does not know the firms' technologies. It is 
also considered to be unfair to prescribe different policies to the firms. By widespread 
opinion of the public and their representatives, firms are supposed to make their own 
decisions about their output in an economy with free enterprise. This paper is not 
about incomplete information in the sense that the government has prior (probability) 
beliefs about the firms' technologies. If the government, however, has to choose a "fair" 
policy that treats all the firms alike, complete information is not necessary anyway. To 
choose, for instance, an optimal linear tax, it is sufficient to know the existing types of 
technologies and how many there are of each type, but not exactly, what firm has what 
technology. 7 Hence, we will assume for the remainder of this paper that the government 
knows at least what technologies there are. 
We also assume that the emissions generated by each firm can be perfectly monitored 
by the authorities without costs. So, the firms will pay a tax bill exactly according to 
the amount of their emitted pollutants (in section 5). In case of holding permits, firms
cannot emit more than the number of permits allows them to do. Otherwise, we assume, 
a high penalty has to be paid. So there is no room for moral hazard. Needless to say 
that also this a strong abstraction. 
5 Pigouvian Taxes
By a Pigouvian Taxes we mean a linear tax tariff on emissions. Firm i has to pay a bill of 
T · ei if it emits ei units of the pollutant, where T is the tax rate. Producing qi units, firm
i's costs amount to ciqi +re;= (c; + rdi)q;. We do not impose a condition on the sign
of T. Negative r's, mean a subsidy. Indeed, we will see that for low social damage it is
optimal to subsidize pollution, a seemingly perverse phenomenon at first thought. Since 
we retain the assumption of Cournot competition, the firms go on choosing Cournot­
N ash quantities if T is such that it is profitable for both firms to produce, and firm i 
produces its monopoly output if firm j chooses qj( T) = 0. This behavior can be gathered
in the following equation. 
P(qi(r) + qj(r)) + P'(qi(r) + qj(r))qi(r) - (ci +rd;)= 0 (5.1) 
Vi with q;(r) > 0 and Vj =Ji with qj(T) ;:=: 0.
What is the government's program? It wants to find the optimal tax rate under 
the constraint· that the firms set Nash quantities' if they both produce, and monopoly 
quantities if only one of them is active, that is, if q;(r) is given by (5.1). Hence, it has to
7This information structure is reminiscent of the second degree price discrimination literature. In 
MASKIN and RILEY'S model [9], the monopolist has to know what kinds of consumer there are, but 
not which consumers has which utility function. The same structure can be found in ROTHSCHILD 
and STIGLITZ [12], and STIGLITZ [16] in the analysis of insurance markets. Of course, assuming this 
information structure is more appealing when there are many agents rather than only two as in our 
model. 
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(5.2) 
Observe that the additional costs of size rqi for the firms and the tax revenue for
the government cancel out if we assume that the government redistributes them lump 
sum back to the firms, or even to consumers. This does not matter. What matters is 
that the government has no objective to collect tax revenues in this industrial sector. 
Especially, there is no additional technology the government can buy in order to reduce 
the aggregate emissions E, once these have been dumped into the environment by the 
firms. To solve (5.2), it is useful to know the behavior of q;(r), i = 1, 2, especially, what
firm closes first and when the other firm switches to monopoly behavior as r increases.
Let rP be the duopoly tax (or subsidy), at which firm i just closes in competition with
firm j, that is, rP satisfies
qi(rP) = 0 ,  qi(r) > 0 for r < rP or r > rP, and q;(rp) > 0 . (5.3) 
Lemma 5.1 a) If�< 0, firm 2 does not produce at all Vr, or closes first as r increases,
formally the latter means, :Jrf such that q2( r) = 0 Vr 2: rf, q2( r) > 0 Vr < rf and
qi(rf) > 0.
b) If�= 0, firm 2 does not produce at all Vr, or both firms close simultaneously.
c) If� > 0, firm 1 closes first as r increases, formally the latter means, 3rf such
that q1(r) = 0 Vr 2: rf, qi(r) > 0 Vr < rf and q2(rf) > 0.
The next Lemma converts Lemma 5.1 c) 
Lemma 5.2 If 3rf satisfying (5.3) then � > 0.
Let r(s) := arg maxT Wf'T(r) be the optimal linear emission tax, and let SD := {s E
lRlq;(r(s)) > 0 for i = 1, 2} be the set of those damage parameters where both firms
produce under the optimal tax, and let SD be its closure. Let rD(s) := r(s) for those s 
-D that are in S . First order conditions8 imply
-D' Vs ES (5.4)
taking right/left derivatives on the boundary of SD. Assume that the second order
condition 
8for short: f.o.c.s for short in the remainder. 
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-D Vs ES , (5.5) 
is satisfied. It can be shown that this is the case under Assumption 1.9
Lemma 5.3 Under Assumption 1, i} Q'(r) < 0, ii) E'(r) < 0.10
Differentiating (5.4) w.r.t. s and solving for the derivative rD'(s) yields
D'( ) S12(E(r), s)E'(r) 0 r s = > d':;;r (rD(s)) 
by Assumptions 1 and 2 and Lemma·5.3. Hence, if there is s :'.:: 0 such that
rD(s) = rF 
(5.6) 
(5.7) 
the solution is unique. Observe that in case of ti. > 0, if solutions of (5. 7) exist for both
i = 1, 2, then sf < sf by Lemma 5.2 and 5.3. Hence we define11
{ solution of (5. 7) in s if it exists,
sf := -oo else if i = 2
oo else 
(5.8)
This means, sf is that damage parameter for which the value of tax function rD equals
rF if such a parameter exists. The settings -oo and oo are made for convenience for
later on. 
For the subsequent analysis it is useful to consider briefly: 
The case of pure monopoly. Let us assume for a moment that only firm j is around 
and is to be regulated by an emission tax. 
Setting qi= 0 in (5.1), we get the f.o.c. for profit maximization of the monopolistic
firm j. Differentiating w.r.t. r and solving for qj(r) yields
1(r)= � <0 1 2P'(q;) + P"(q;)q; 
by Assumption 1. The f.o.c. for the optimal tax implies 
P(q;(r))- S1(d;q;(r),s)d; - c; = 0 ,
(5
.
9) 
(5.10) 
since qj(r) of 0. Let rMJ(s) be the optimal tax to regulate the monopolist j given the
damage parameters. Differentiating (5.10) w.r.t. s yields
M' S12( d;q;( r ), s )dJ r ' ( s) = 
[P'( q;( r)) - S11 ( d;q;( r ), s )]qj( r) 
since S12 > 0, P' < 0, S11 > 0, qj < 0. As a byproduct we get
>0 
9Here we need the lower bound for P". For linear demand, (5.5) is easily established. 
10 Also if you skip some proofs, you may look at this one and read Remark A.1. 
11The superscript stands for "duopoly". 
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(5.11) 
Corollary 5.1 The optimal emission tax to regulate a monopolist yields social optimum. 
This follows simply from (5.10) which is also the f.o.c. of social optimum if only one firm
were around. Details are omitted. 
Back to duopoly. If there is s :'.:: 0 such that
(5.12) 
the solution is unique, since TM; ( s) is strictly increasing. Then let Vi = 1, 2, j = 3 - i : 
{ solution of (5.12) in s if it exists,
sM; = -oo else if i = 2 ' 
oo else 
(5.13) 
This means, s:t1; is that damage parameter for which the value of the monopoly tax
function equals Tp and where firm i would just be on the margin between opening and
closing if the monopoly police TM' applies.
The next Lemma is the keystone for the characterization of the optimal Pigouvian 
tax. 
Lemma 5.4 Let WM; ( T, s) be the welfare when only firm j is around and reacts as a 
monopolist upon the tax T, and the damage parameter is s. 
a) If .6. < 0 and 0 < sf < oo, then
owM, 
OT (Tf , sf)< 0 .
b) If .6. > 0 and 0 < sf < oo, then
0WM1 
OT (Tf, sf) > 0.
c) If .6. > 0 and 0 < sf < oo, then
oWM, .. 
OT (Tf , sf)< 0 .
(5.14) 
(5.15) 
(5.16) 
Basically, Lemma 5.4 says that, if the tax is such one firm, say i, is just on the margin
to close down, whereas firm j # i is still in the market, this tax rate is not optimal, if
firm i were not around. The Lemma also indicates the directions into which the tax has
to be moved in order to increase welfare. Lemma 5.4 implies:
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Lemma 5.5 a) If� < 0, and sf :'.'.: 0 then sf < s�' . Moreover, there are no oo > s�2, 
sf:'.'.: 0.
b) If�> 0, and s�':'.'.: 0 then s�'< sf.
After these preparations we are ready to characterize the optimal linear tax as a 
function of the damage parameter s. 
Proposition 5.1 
a) If� < 0, then
{ 
TD(s) for 0 < s < D (both firms produce)Sz' 
T(s) = Tf for max{O, sf} < s < SM1 (only firm 1 produces) ( 5.17) 2 ' 
TM1(s) for max{O, s�'} < s (only firm 1 produces)
b) If�> 0, then
TM1 (s) for 0 < s < s�1 (only firm 1 produces)
TD for max{O, s�'} < s < D (only firm 1 produces)2 Sz ' 
T(s) = TD(s) for max{O, sf} < s < D S1 ' (both firms produce) (5. 18) 
TD for SD < s < M2 (only firm 2 produces)1 1 S1 ' 
TM2(s) for SM2 1 < s (only firm 2 produces) 
c} If� = 0, then 
T(s) = TD(s) vs::::: 0 (both firms produce} or (5.19) 
T(s) = TM'(s) vs::::: 0 (only firm 1 produces) (5.20) 
Proposition 5.1 follows immediately from Lemmata 5.1 - 5.5. Lemma 5.4 is most impor­
tant among all and a bit tricky to prove. Notice that some of the intervals, for example 
[O, s�' ] may be empty.
In words, Proposition 5.1 says that if firm 2 has the strictly worse technology, that is
if�< 0, it may be the case that for low values of s both firms produce. By Lemma 5.1, 
firm 2 closes first as s increases. For s E [max{O, sf}, s�'], the tax is constant in s and
equals. Tf .. -T..his..is .. due..an.incentive.constraint: .. Buppose sf .. > 0. If.s .increases towards
sf, T ( s) goes to Tf, that is, firm 2 closes down. For higher taxes than Tf, firm 1 is a
monopolist. Hence T(s) fo TD(s), and firm 1 has to be taxed as a monopolist. However,
if firm 2 could be prohibited to produce for s slightly higher than sf, the optimal tax
for the monopoly firm 1 would be lower than Tf for s � s�1• This follows immediately
from Lemma 5.4. But firm 1 cannot be told to shut down by law. At least this is what
we assume. Hence, to preve11t firrr1 l from producing, t11e tax r11ust riot be lower t}1an 
Tf For s :'.'.: s�', T( s) = TM1 ( s) :'.'.: Tf, and T( s) is strictly increasing in s. Notice that
11 
in case a) it can never happen that only firm 2 produces as a monopolist. This follows 
from the fact that firm 1 produces at least for 7 = 0. 
In part b) of the proposition, where firm 1 has the lower cost c1 S c2, but firm 2
has the "cleaner" technology, it may be the case that the lower cost firm 1 produces 
as a monopolist for low damage parameters. Then, both firms produce for intermediate 
values of s, whereas for high s only the "cleaner" firm produces. Here, there may be two 
intervals for r(s) being constant in s. On the first interval [max{O, s�'}, sf] (which may 
be empty) we have r( s) = rf < 0, that is, we get a subsidy. 12 On the second interval
[sf, .sr2J (which is always nonempty for d2 > 0) we have r(s) = rf > 0, that is, r is
a real tax. Depending on the parameters it is also possible that for s = 0, both firms 
produce under the optimal tax. But the case that firm 2 is a monopolist for all s is ruled 
out. 
Figure 2 about here. 
In figure 2 we have depicted the optimal tax as a function of s for the case b) of the 
proposition where all the sr•, sf are positive.13
Corollary 5.2 a} If ti. < 0, the tax yields social optimum for s 2': s�'. If the firms are
sufficiently different, in particular, if d2 is sufficiently high, the tax solution yields social 
optimum Vs 2': 0 .
b) If ti. > 0,  the tax yields social optimum for s E [O, s�'] and for s 2': sr2•
c} If Ci. = 0 and c1 =F c2, the tax yields social optimum for no s, if for some s both
firms produce under the optimal tax. 
d} If c1 = c2 and d1 = d2, the tax yields social optimum for all s.
The corollary follows from the fact that we can impose the optimal monopoly tax on firm 
1 if Ci. < 0 and s 2': s�', or if Ci. > 0 and 0 S s S s�'. Accordingly we can impose the
optimal monopoly tax on firm 2 if ti. > 0 and s 2': sr1• For ti. = 0 and C1 =F C2, we know
from Proposition 3.1 that only form 1 should produce for all s. Under taxes, however, 
no firm p.i:odnces..alone.if .they.both .. produce .. under. laissez faire. Only if both firms are 
alike, we can achieve social optimum under taxes, which is also EBERT's [4] result. We 
will return to the efficiency issue in section 7. Finally we state: 
12To see this consider first the natural case where both firms produce for r = 0. Then firm 1 will drop 
out first as r increases. If at all, firm 2 can only drop out whereas firm 2 stays if r decreases, that is, 
becomes negative. If q2 = 0 for r = 0, then it is easy to see that it will produce for nor. 
13By shifting this curve to the left and cutting off at s = 0 one gets the shape for the other cases. For 
case a) interchange the subscripts 1 and 2 and shift the curve to the left such that sf and s�' vanish. 
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Proposition 5.2 Under Assumption 1 we get r(O) < 0 for all L'>..
Thus, for low damage parameters, the firms' pollution will be subsidized. We know that 
a monopolist or a ( Cournot-) oligopoly produce less than the social optimum (which is
equal to the competitive output of the lower cost firm) . From the theory of regulating
monopolies or oligopolies (see BARON and Meyerson [1] , or recently EBERT [4]) we know
that in the absence of externalities and under complete information, the firms' output 
is to be subsidized in order to increase welfare. A monopolist can even be brought 
to .. produce the competitive output. In our model, the subsidies work indirectly via 
subsidizing emissions, which stand in fixed proportions to the firms' output. 
6 Permits
In this section we assume that the government gives out a number of L pollution permits 
which may be traded among the firms. Each permit allows a firm to emit one unit of 
the pollutant. We need not care about whether the permits will be bought from the 
government and at what price. We could assume that the government distributes them 
fairly among the firms such that each firm holds L/2 permits at the beginning. As we 
will see, the initial allocation of permits will not effect the outcome. Assume that L be 
arbitrarily divisible. 
6.1 The Firms' Behavior 
The process going on in the economy may be divided into 3 steps. At first, the firms 
hold some initial endowment (11, 12) of permits, with Ii+ 12 = L. In the second step they
may trade, that is here, one firm sells some or all permits to the other firm. Firms end 
up with a new allocation of permits ( e1, e2) with e1 + e2 = L. In the third step, firms
engage into ( Cournot-)competition and choose quantities qf1, qf under the constraint
(6.1) 
which is binding if ei is sufficiently low. To figure out how the firms will trade the permits,
denote by IIf ( e1, e2) the profit of firm i if the final allocation of permits in the second
step has been (ei, e2) and both firms choose Nash-quantities under the constraint (6.1).
Observe that there is a gain from trade if and only if there is an allocation ( e1, e2) such
that 
IIf (ii, 12) + II:;' (ii, 12) < IIf ( ei, e2) + II:;' ( e1, e2)
In this case there is T which can be interpreted as transfer-payment from firm 1 to firm 
2 (which may be negative, of course) such that
nNt \ 1 rrii-11 \e1, e2J -r- 1 
II:;'(e1, e2)
- T 
rrN11 1 \ > .L.L1\t1,i2J,
> II:;'(l1,l2).
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How the firms figure out T is nothing we have to care about. For example, they could 
agree on the Nash-bargaining solution. The maximum gain from trading permits is 
determined by 
(6.2) 
Accepting the assumption that firms behave as profit maximizers it is natural to make 
the following assumption: 
Assumption 4 Firms trade permits in the second phase such that the final allocation 
( ei, e;) solves (6.2). 
Notice that this assumption allows also for the case that one firm buys all the other firm's 
permits such that the market ends up with monopoly. And indeed, this will happen for 
some range of values for L as we will see. 
Before the government can solve the problem how to choose the optimal number 
of permits contingent on s, we have to analyze how the firms will determine the final 
allocation by solving (6.2). For this consider the following program: 
maxP(q1 + q2)[q1 + qz] - c1q1 - c2q2 s.t. diq1 + dzqz :SL . (6.3) qi ,q2 
After solving (6.3), we will show that the resulting quantities form a Nash equilibrium, 
under the constraint that q; :S e;f d;. Denote by qmon the monopoly output of the lower
cost firm 1 ( which is also the monopoly outcome of the horizontally integrated industry). 
Denote further by Lmon = di qmon the number of permits that are at least necessary for
producing qmon· 
Proposition 6.1 a) If� ::; 0, V L ::'.'. 0 the solution of (6.3) is given by 14
q1(L) = min {qmon, �} , qz(L) = 0 
b) If c1 < c2 and 15 � > 0, there are L, L with 0 :SL< L such that the solution of (6.3)
is given by 
q1(L) 
.. -q21J,) 
�in {qmon , f, } } 
q1(L) > 0 }q2(L) > 0 
q1(L) 0 
} 
q2(L) L d2 
for L ::'.'. L 
for L>L>L 
for L::; L and d2 > 0. 
14If both firms are alike, the solution is not unique either firm could buy all the permits. 
15If c1 = c2 interchange the names of the firms and apply case a). 
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Moreover, q;( L) are continuous in L and Q( L) := q1 ( L )+q2( L) is constant for L :::".: L :::".: L. 
To interpret the proposition: if Li. ::; 0, firm 1 buys all the permits and behaves as a
monopolist. If L > Lmon, firm 1 also buys all the permits but does not use them all. In 
this case, there is underproduction combined with underpollution. By giving out more 
permits, however, the government cannot induce the firms to produce more than the 
monopoly output qmon·
If Li. > 0, the same thing happens as long as L :::".: L. If L :::".: L :::".: L, the two firms
shift production continuously from firm 1 to firm 2 as L decreases, holding total output 
constant. For L ::; L, the less polluting firm 2 buys all the permits and produces alone.
Proposition 6.2 The solution of (6.2} forms a Nash-equilibrium.
The proof is obvious for L :::".: L and L ::; L since then the firms just produce their
monopoly quantities under the constraint that q; ::; L / d;. The other firm does not hold
any permits and hence cannot produce. If L < L < L, for q1(L) and q2(L) to form a
Nash-equilibrium it is sufficient to show that 
for i = 1, 2, (6.4) 
that is, each firm would like to increase quantities, given the other firm produces q;(L), 
but cannot since it is constrained by its number of permits. ( 6.4) will be established in 
the appendix. 
6.2 The Government's program 
Given these reactions of the firms when a number of L permits is in the market, and 
given the damage parameters, the government has to find the optimal size of L. Further 
denote Q(L) := q1(L) + q2(L), e;(L) := d;q;(L), i = 1,2. Hence it has to solve the 
following program: 
loQ(
L
) 
maxW;'er(L) :=max P(z)dz - S(L,s)- c1q1(L)- c2q2(L)
L L o 
(6.5) 
If we want to emphasize the dependence on the damage parameters we write wPer(L, s) . 
Let L(s) denote the optimal number of permits contingent on s, that is, the solution of 
(6.5). Before we characterize this solution, we state some preparatory notations and 
lemmata. 
Let16ED = {s I 3 LD(s) such that dW;'er(LD(s))jd L = Oand q1(LD(s)) > 0,q2(LD(s)) >
0} be the set of parameters s for which there exists a number of permits which yields a 
16In the following, the superscript D stands for "Duopoly" again. 
15 
local maximum of W;'er(L) such that both firms produce. Notice that this need not, and 
in general will not, be a global maximum for all s. Let ED be the closure of ED. Denote 
by LD( s) the solution of dWf';J;L(s)) = 0 for all s E ED, taking right and left derivatives,
respectively, on the boundary. 
Further let LM'(s) be the optimal number of permits if only firm i would be around 
and produce as a monopolist. It is easy to see from the f.o.c.'s that LM'(·) is decreasing 
in s , as long as it is binding for the firms, that is, as long as LM'(·) ::; Lman, and also 
that LD(-) is decreasing Vs E ED. Hence we can define 17f by
(6.6) 
and 17f and by
(6. 7) 
In words, 17f is the damage parameter where firm 1 just closes if s increases towards 17f 
and L(s) = LD(s). Similarly, 17f is the damage parameter where firm 2 just closes if s
decreases towards 17f and L(s) = LD(s).
Analogously, we define 17�1 by 
(6.8) 
and 17�2 and by
(6.9) 
In words, 17�2 is the damage parameter where firm 1 would open up if s fell below 17�2 
and L(s) = LM2(s). Similarly, 17�1 is the damage parameter where firm 2 would just 
open up ifs slightly exceeded 17�1 and L(s) = LM1(s). The next two lemmata are the
analoga to Lemma 5.4 and 5.5. 
Lemma 6.1 {With a little abuse of notation) let WM1(L,s) be the welfare when only 
firm j is around and reacts as a monopolist upon L, and the damage parameter is s. 
If�> 0, then 
and if additionally d2 > 0, 
This implies the following 
Lemma 6.2 If� > 0, then 
awM1 - D 
8L 
(L, s2 )>0 ,
awM, 
· BL· (L,sf) >0.
and if d2 > 0 then 
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(6.10) 
(6.11) 
(6.12) 
Notice that 0"�1 may be smaller, greater or equal to O"f. Lemma 6.1 says that LM1 ( s) 
is greater than LD(s) for s close to O"f, and if d2 > 0, then LM2(s) is greater than LD(s) 
for s close to O"f'. This implies that like the optimal tax, L( s) must be constant on the 
interval [O"f, O"f12]. For, if s = O"f, then LD(s) = L, and by Proposition 6.1 b ), firm 2 buys
all the permits from firm 1. For s :;::: O"f, firm 2 behaves as a monopolist. Forbidding firm
1 to produce, the optimal number of permits equals LM1 ( s ), which is higher than L if s is
greater but close to O"f. Giving out LM2(s) > L many permits, however, firm 2 does not 
buy all the permits. Hence, L(s) has to be constant and equal to L for s E [O"f,O"f12] in 
order to keep firm 1 out of the market. Notice that this argument is very similar to the 
optimal linear tax scheme, where the tax rate also has to be constant on certain intervals 
of damage parameters. 
On the other hand, L( s) must be discontinuous somewhere in the interval ( O"f', 0"�1 ). 
To see this, consider first the left hand boundary of this interval, O"f'. If we employ 
the "duopoly-policy" LD, we get LD(O"f) = L and q2 = 0. Employing the monopoly
policy LM, w.r.t. firm 1 we get LM1(0"f') > L by Lemma 6.1. Let us assume that
LM1(0"f) < Lmon- Obviously, LM1(-) is the better policy than LD(-) for s = O"f. Hence,
By arguing similarly the other way round, we get for 0"�1: 
WPer (LM'(O"�'),O"�') < WP" (LD(O"�'),O"�')
Since LD(-), LM1(-) and wPer(·, ·)are continuous there must be some intersection O"int E
( O"f, 0"�1) such that 
and L(·) jumps down from LM1(-) to LD(-), at least if 0"�1 < O"f. In the appendix we will
show that this intersection is indeed unique. The case 0"�1 :;::: O"f is similar and will be
treated in the proof of the next proposition which characterizes completely the optimal 
number of permits as a function of the damage parameter s. 
Before doing this, we define O"mon as the damage parameter, from where on the mo­
nopolistic firm 1 faces a real capacity constraint if it is regulated by LM1 ( ·) by
L( O"mon) := Lmon 
Hence, LM, is not unique, each L :;::: Lmon would do the job. For convenience we set
S � Smon (6.13) 
Proposition 6.3 a) If L!. :'S 0, the optimal number of permits as a function of s is given
by L(s) = LM1(s) Vs:;::: 0 .  In this case, only firm 1 produces for all s:;::: 0. 
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b) If� > 0, the optimal number of permits as a function of s is given by
LM1(s) for
LD(s) for
L(s) = 
L for 
LM2(s) for
0 ::; s ::; rTint
rTint < s ::; af
max { <Yint, uf} < s :S af42
S > (TM2- 1 
·where rTint is the solution in s of 
(only firm 1 produces)
(both firms produce, 
interval may be 
empty) 
(only firm 2 produces)
(only firm 2 produces)
ifs<aD - 1 
if s > af
(6.14) 
Proof: a) follows immediately from Proposition 6.1, b) follows also from that result and 
Lemma 6.2. For af1  < af, the argument has been almost elaborated above. For details,
see the appendix. 
Observe that apart from the monopoly effect for large values of L, we get the same 
structure as in social optimum: If� ::; 0, the worse firm 2 never produces under the first
best as well as under the permit solution. Thus we obtain the following corollary: 
Corollary 6.1 If firm 2 has the worse technology, that is, if� ::; 0 the permit solution
yields the social optimum for all s 2: rTmon· 
If� > 0, only firm 1 produces for low values of s, both firms produce for intermediate 
values of s, and only firm 2 produces for high values of s. Output is constant in s when 
both firms produce. Like in social optimum, production shifts from the lower (production) 
cost but more polluting firm to the higher cost but less polluting firm. L( s) is depicted in 
figure 3. However, if� > 0, we do not get social optimum under permits for all s 2: 0 as 
the following result shows. Recall that both firms produce in social optimum if s E (�, s)
- denote total output on (�, s) by Q -, �nd under permits if s E (a into af) - denote total
output under permits on ( rTint , af) by Q .
Proposition 6.4 
. Figure 3 about here. 
i} O'int > §.., ii) af > s and iii) Q > Q.
For linear demand and quadratic c!_,amage function one can even shov  that that Vint > 2.§., 
and af = 2s, furthermore, Q = 2Q. 
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Corollary 6.2 If Li. > 0, The permit solution is socially optimal for s E [o-mon, £) and
for s :'.:: O"ff1 > s. 
This result seems to be disillusening quite a bit, however, the permit regime is not that 
bad in comparison with the tax solution. Specially for relatively high values of s it yields 
better results in terms of welfare than the tax regime does as we will see in the next 
section. 
-Notice a .. finaLremark on this ..section .. Ifs ::;;. Smon·, we.saw that. the .optimal number 
of permits is not unique. All L :'.:: Lmon = diqmon lead to the monopoly outcome qmon· 
Giving out no permits at all, leads to the laissez faire Cournot Nash equilibrium. If s is 
close to 0, therefore, no permits are better than any L :'.:: Lmon, whereas for s :'.:: Smon but
close to Smon permits are better. Thus if taxes are not under discussion, but the question 
is wether permits or not, the optimal permit policy is laissez faire up to a certain s0, and 
to put up with monopoly for s0 :S s :S Smon·17
7 Comparison and Discussion of the Policies
Recall for the remainder of the paper that sf, sf, sff 2, s�' denote the border cases for
s if we consider taxes. For permits we use the Greek O"f, O"f , O"ff' ,  O"�' ,  O"int and O"mon·
Throughout this paper we saw that the sign of Li. played a crucial role in the analysis 
of the model. If this is not positive, a social planner will not allow firm 2 to produce for 
any damage parameters. Under the permit solution, firm 2 also never holds any permits, 
if we accept Assumption 4. Thus, for s :'.:: O"mon, the government can always induce firm 
1 to produce the social optimum. For L :'.:: Lmon, firm 1 behaves as a monopolist under 
"laissez faire". The government can not induce the monopolist to produce more by giving 
out more permits. Thus, for s close to zero the tax regime yields higher welfare than 
the permit solution. This requires not much of a proof. By giving out more permits 
than Lmon the government can do nothing to increase welfare, whereas it can indirectly 
subsidize output by negatively taxing, that is, subsidizing pollutants. This seems to be 
some funny perverse effect of pollution control. But it is simply due to the fact that in 
absence of negative external effects from production oligopoly produces less than social 
optimum (cf. [4]) . If both firms are alike we even get:
Corollary 7.1 If both firms are alike, the tax solution yields the socially optimal outcome 
for all s :'.:: 0. The permit solution is socially optimal only for s 2 O" mon . 
The permit solution, on the other hand, is better than the tax solution if the social 
17 so is determined by the intersection of welfare under laissez faire and welfare under monopoly as a 
function of s. 
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damage from pollution is not too small, s ;:::: <Tmon• and one firm is worse than but not 
too different from the other firm. 
Corollary 7.2 If firm 2 has the worse technology, that is� < 0, but is not too bad such
both firms produce (that is l�I is not too large) and s�' > O"mon, the permit solution is 
at least as good as the tax solution for s ;:::: a mon (that is for those s for which the better 
firm 1 pollutes too much as a monopolist under "laissez faire"), and strictly better for
s E ( O"mon, s�1 ) .
Let us now turn to the case � > 0. Proposition 6.4 showed that under permits firm
2 opens too late and firm 1 closes too late as s increases C_'?mpared with social optimum.
Moreover, the supplied quantity if both firms produce ( = Q) is lower under permits than
in social optimum ( = Q). The next proposition shows that under taxes the situation is
even worse in some respect. 
Proposition 7.1 If� > 0, then a�' < s�' .
In words, the damage parameter, from where on the socially optimal solution is achieved 
under permits is smaller than the damage parameter, from where on the optimum is 
achieved under taxes. 
Corollary 7.3 If� > 0, the permit regime achieves the social optimum for a greater
range of damage parameters, for which it is desirable that the higher polluting firm shuts 
down, than the tax regime does. 
In the light of this corollary, the permit solution is not as bad as it seemed to be from 
Proposition 6.4. From Proposition 7.1 it follows also that the permit solution is better 
than the tax solution for values slightly lower than a�' .  If s further decreases, welfare 
under taxes may intersect -welfare under permits as the following example demonstrates. 
Example 7.1 Let P(Q) = 1 - Q, S(E, s) = �E2 and c1 = 0.25, c2 = 0.5, d1 = 1, 
d2 = 0.5. Under this constellation, � = d1(1 - c2 ) - d2(1 - c1) > 0, and we get
§_ = 2,_s __ -4,_ thal.is,jn sociaLoptimum .. both.firms are active for s E {2,4). Under the
optimal Pigouvian tax, both firms are active for s = 0. Firm 1 closes for sf = 16. For
s E (sf,s�' )  = (16,20), the tax is constant and equals T = rf = 0.666. Only when
s ;:=:: 20, the social optimum is obtained by the Pigouvian tax. From figure 4 we see that
there is overproduction for s E (0, 2.25) and underproduction for s E (2.25, 20), combined
with excess pollution for s E (2.25, 6) and underpollution for s E (0, 0.25) U (6, 20) (see
figure 5). Under per1r1its, social optini.u.m is attained for s E [umon, uf) = (0.125, 2) 
and s ;:=:: a�' = 12. For s E (2, 12) there is underproduction combined with excess
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pollution for s E (£, O"int) = (2,4.2) and underpollution for s E [a;n1, a;'12 ) = [4.2, 12).
For the " most" values of s,  welfare is lower under taxes as under permitsi8, however, for
s E (2, 6.5), the optimal Pigouvian tax yields a higher welfare than the optimal number 
of permits (cf. Figure 6). So, no policy is superior in general. Compared with " laissez 
faire" , both solutions yield approximately good results as can be seen from figure 7. 
Other interesting examples could be provided, however, limits on space force us to close 
here. 
8 A Tax/ Subsidy System on pollutants and output
yields social optimum - " almost always" 
We saw that taxes or permits on pollutants are in general inefficient. Let us assume now 
that emissions are taxed or subsidized by T ,  whereas output is taxed or subsidized by (. 
Proposition 8.1 Optimal taxes/subsidies on emission and output yield social optimum 
if firms engage in Cournot competition and di # d2 • 
Proof: Since the proof is very easy we present it immediately. Let s be given and let 
qi (s) , i = 1, 2 be the socially optimal outputs. Under Cournot competition the f.o.c.'s
for the Nash-equilibrium under taxes T on emissions and ( on output are: 
P(q1 + q2) + P'(q1 + q2)qi - Ct - ( - rd1 = 0 
P(q1 + q2) + P'(qi + q2)q2 - c2 - ( - rd2 = 0
(8.1) 
(8.2) 
Setting q; = qi(s) for i = 1 , 2, we get two linearly independent equations in T and ( if
di # d2• Since the Nash-equilibrium is unique by Assumption 1 we are done. Q.E.D. 
Notice, however, that this result is due to the fact that there are only two firms and 
exactly two policy tools which can influence the firms costs and hence force the output 
into the right direction. Hence, the qualifier "almost always" in the headline refers to the 
exception that d1 = d2. If additionally c1 = c2, first best can also be achieved, however, 
not if Ct < c2 and di = d2. 
9 Final Remarks
We investigated and completely characterized the optimal linear tax on emissions and the 
optimal number of permits for an asymmetric duopoly. Both regimes do not yield social 
optimum in general. Especially, the allocation of production turned out to be inefficient 
18This, of course, does not mean very much since we have no measure on the range of s .  
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under the optimal tax as well as under permits if both firms are active and if firms are 
different. The permit regime yields a higher welfare if one firm has a better technology 
for alls and if the lower cost firm would overpollute as a monopolist. The permit regime 
is also better than taxes for a greater range of high damage parameters for which the 
lower cost but worse polluting firm should close down in social optimum. The permit 
regime is clearly worse if social damage is so low that lower cost firm underproduces (and 
hence underpollutes) as a monopolist such that pollution should be subsidized under the 
tax regime. In this case, the lower cost firm exploits the permit regime, by buying all 
the permits and thereby building up its monopoly position. For intermediate values of 
s nothing can be said in general! Welfare has to be compared under both regimes. But 
the optimal size of permits or taxes has to be calculated anyway! 
In Section 8 we saw that we can get the efficient outcome by taxing output and 
emissions. We mentioned that this result does not generalize to more than two firms 
and nonlinear technologies. However, one may improve upon linear taxes by looking for 
optimal incentive compatible nonlinear taxes. This would in general mean to offer the 
firms a menu of output and emission levels combined with taxes or subsidies. Even so, 
the investigation of permits and linear taxes, as done here, is important since those tools 
are, first, relatively easily enforced and secondly, and more important, become more and 
more known, better understood, and discussed in the public. Since both tools again are 
equivalent for sufficiently high damage, and at least keep welfare above zero if optimally 
calculated, in contrast to laissez faire, the answer to those politicians who go on wasting 
time by struggling about the right tool should be "it does not matter so much what you 
do, rather do something" . 
A Appendix 
Notation: Since we will talk several times oft left sided derivatives (for short: Ls.cl.) 
and right sided derivatives (r.s.d.) we write J1(x) := limh�O,h<x f(x+hi-f(x) for the l.s.d.
and f'(x), respectively for the r.s.d . .
Proof of Proposition 3.1: If di ::0: d2 (and ci < c2) or di < d2 and c1 = c2, it is
obvious that only firm 1 should produce for s > 0, since it has no higher cost and does 
not pollute more than firm 2. So let di > d2• F.o.c.s of the Lagrange function w.r.t. qi 
and q2 yield 
P(qi + q2 ) - S1(E,s) · di - c1 + µi = 0
P(qi + q2 ) - Si(E, s) · d2 - c2 + µ2 = 0
(A.l) 
(A.2) 
Here µi ,  µ2 are the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers w.r.t. the constraints qi 2". 0 and q2 2". 0. 
Eliminating S1(E, s) and assuming µ1 = tt2 = 0 yields
(A.3) 
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Thus, f:. > 0 is necessary for both firms to produce. Furthermore, the first equality in 
(A.3) implies P(Q) = (dic2 - d2c1)/(d1 - d2),  or that Q = p-1 (d1c2 - d2c1)/(d1 - d2) is
independent of s. (Notice that f:. > 0 implies di c2 > d2c1 . )  
Now assume µ1 2". 0, µ2 = 0,  that is, qi = 0, q2 > 0 .  Then (A.l) and (A.2) become
P(q2) - Si (d2q2, s) · di - Ct + µ1 = 0
P(q2) - Si (d2q2, s) · d2 - c2 = 0 
(A.4) 
(A.5) 
Eliminating S1 (E;s) yields f:. > (di -d2)P( q1 +q2) -d1 c2+d2ci = d2µ2 2". 0. Thus, f:. > 0
is necessary for firm 2 to produce alone. Hence, for f:. :::; 0 only firm 1 produces in social
optimum for any damage function S, and the f.o.c. is P(q1) - S1(d1q1, s) · d1 - c1 = 0. 
From this it follows easily that q1 decreases as s increases. This proves part a). 
Next observe that q1 + q2 is bounded by p-1(c1 ) ,  hence E = d1q1 + d2q2 is bounded.
Subtracting (A.2) from (A.l) yields 
(A.6) 
Since E is bounded, for s sufficiently small, ( A.6) cannot have a solution in qi and q2 for
µ1 2". 0, µ2 = 0. Hence, µi = 0, µ2 > 0, implying qi > 0, q2 = 0.
Since qi + q2 =: Q is constant for q1 > 0, q2 > 0, we have E > d2Q > 0 for d2 > 0.
Hence, for large s, (A.6) can only have a solution for µ1 > 0, µ2 = 0 implying q1 = 0, 
q2 > 0. Since S is continuous, there must be §. with q2 = 0, µ2 = 0, µi = 0, q1 > 0 and 
s with q1 = 0, µ1 = 0, µ2 = 0, q2 > 0 and q1 > 0, q2 > 0 for s E (§., s). Hence Q is also
continuous in s. For d2 = 0, s = oo .  Finally observe that for s E (,:,, s), (A.6) becomes
c2 - Ct = (di - d2)S1(d1q1 + d2q2, s) .  Since Ct < c2 and f:. > 0 imply di > d2, and since
Q is constant on (,:,,s), qi(s) must be decreasing and q2(s) must be increasing in s on
(§., s). Obviously, also E and W are continuous and decreasing as a function of s when
the socially optimal quantities are chosen. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 5.1 We prove it indirectly. Suppose r' is such that firm 1 just closes
as a monopolist, that is, q1(r') = 0 Vr 2". r', and q1 (r) > 0 Vr < r' - t:, moreover, 
q2(r) = 0 Vr > r' - t:  for some t: > 0. Then firm l's f.o.c. at (qi, q2) = (0, 0) is 
p - Ct - T1 di = 0 (A.7) 
Taking th� right sided derivative of firm 2's profit function at ( q1 , q2) = (0, 0) , we get 
(A.8) 
Solving (A.7) for r' and substituting into (A.8) yields f:. < 0. 
Suppose now firm 1 doses first, arguing analogously yields Ll. > 0. If both firms 
close simultaneously, then (A.8) holds with equality. Together with (A.7) we get f:. = 0. 
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Clearly it cannot happen that firm i just closes at some 71 whereas firm j just opens, 
otherwise q; would be increasing in r for a monopolist, contradicting (5.10). Since c1 :s; 
c2 < p, firm 1 will produce for 7 = 0. Hence it cannot be the case that firm 1 never
produces for all r if� = 0. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 5.2 Suppose there is rf satisfying (5.3). Then the f.o.c's in Nash
equilibrium are 
P(q2) - c, - rfd, - 0 
P(q2) + P'(q2)q2 - c2 - rf d2 0 
Eliminating rf yields�> P(q2) [d, - d2] - d,c2 + d2c1 = 0. Q.E.D. 
(A.9) 
(A.10) 
Proof of Lemma 5.3: (Sketched) Differentiating (5.1) for i = 1, 2 w.r.t. r, adding up 
both equations and solving for Q' yields 
/ d, + d2 Q = 3P'(Q) + P"(Q)Q < O
since 3P'(Q) + P"(Q)Q < 2P'(Q) + P"(Q)Q < 0 by Assumption 1 .  To show ii) requires 
some more effort. Again we differentiate (5.1) for i = 1 ,  2 w.r.t. r, multiply the first 
equation by d1 and the second one by d2. Then we add up and solve for d1q� (r)+d2q�(r) = 
E'( r ) . After some manipulations we get 
E' _ 2P'(Q)[di + d2 - d,d2] - d,d2P"(Q)Q - P'( Q)[3P'( Q) + P"( Q)Q) . (A.11) 
The denominator is positive, the first term of the numerator is negative, but the sign of 
P" is undetermined. Here we need the lower bound of Assumption 1. If P" is sufficiently 
bounded from below, E' is negative. Q.E.D. 
Remark A.1 Observe, however, the interesting phenomenon that total output of emis­
sions may increase as the tax increases if inverse demand is sufficiently concave! (Similar 
results have been found by EBERT {3} and ENDRES [5]). 
Proof of Lemma 5.4 We show c). The remaining claims are demonstrated analo­
gously. Since r(s) solves ('5.2), we have d�:1' (fD(s)) = 0 ' ff qi(rD(s)) > o, i = 1 ,2. For
s = sf the left sided derivative of WPT equals zero: 
dWPT 
dr (rf) = 0  (A.12)
Since also q1(rf) = 0, (A.12) becomes (writing just 7 instead of rf to save space): 
P(q2(r))[qf(r) + q�(r)] - S,(d2q2(r) , s) [d1qi(r) + d2q�(r)] - c,qi(r) - c2q�(r) 0 
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or 
(A.13) 
Consider now the welfare function W.;'1"2 when only firm 2 produces and is taxed as a 
monopolist. First order condition for the optimal monopoly tax yields 
dWM2 
d; (r) = [P(q2(r)) - S1(d2q2(r), s)d2 - c2]q;(r) = 0 (A.14) 
where q; denotes the r.s.d . .  Substituting (A.13) into (A.14) we get 
dW.;'1"2 qi ( rf) 
· 
q;( rf) v 
d (r) = d ' ( D )  d ' ( D) [P(q2(T1 ) ) [d1 - d2] - (d1c2 - d2c1)jT 1 ql 71 + 2q2 71 
On the other hand, we have for rf: 
P(q2) - c1 - rf d1 = 0
P(q2) + P1(q2)q2 - c2 - rf d2 = 0 
(A.15) 
(A.16) 
(A.17) 
Eliminating rf yields [d1-d2]P( q2)-d1c2+d2c1 +d1P'( q2)q2 = 0, hence, [d1 -d2]P( q2( rf) ) ­
d1c2 +d2c1 > 0. Now, q2(rf) < 0 by (5.9), qf (rf) < 0 since firm 1 closes down at T = rf. 
The denominator equals E'(rf) which is also negative by Lemma 5.3), ii). Hence, the 
whole derivative is negative. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Lemma 5.5 We show that � > 0 implies sf < sf12 •  The remaining claims
are demonstrated analogously. Since d�:T ( rf) < 0 if firm 2 is regulated as a monopolist
(suppose firm 1 is not existent for a moment) the optimal tax to regulate a monopoly is 
lower than rf by the last lemma. Since TM ( s) is increasing in s by (5.11 ) ,  sf12 must be 
greater than sf. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 5.2 For s = 0 the f.o.c. of the government's program leads to 
P(Q)Q'(r) - c1q�(r) - c2q�(r) = 0
Adding up the Nash-equilibrium conditions for both firms yields 
2P(Q) + P'(Q)(q1 + q2) - c1 - c2 - r(d1 + d2) = 0
Substituting (A.18) into (A.19) and manipulating yields 
(cl - c2)��i;� - q�(r)) + P'(Q)Q = r(d1 + d2) 
(A.18) 
(A.19) 
(A.20) 
Since c1 < c2, Q' < 0 and P' < 0, the L.H.S. of (A.20) is negative if q� < q�. To get this,
differentiate the Nash-equilibrium conditions of both firms w.r.t. T and subtract one of 
the other. This yields after rearranging: 
I I d1 - d2 P"(Q)(q1 - q2)q1 - q2 = P'(Q) - P'(Q) (A.21) 
It is easy to verify that c1 < c2 implies q1 > q2 in Nash equilibrium. Then the R.H.S. of
( A.21 ) is neagtive, if P is not too concave. 
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Proof of Proposition 6.1 If di < d2, clearly q2 = 0 '<IL 2: 0, hence let di > d2. The
f.o.c.s of the program (6.3) are 
P'(Q) . Q + P(Q) - Ci - >.di + µi = 0
P'(Q) . Q + P(Q) - C2 - >.d2 + µ2 = 0
(A.22) 
(A.23) 
where >.. is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier w.r.t. diqi + d2q2 :::; L, and µi , µ2 are the
multipliers w.r.t. qi 2: 0, q2 2: 0. Suppose now >.. /o 0, µi 2: 0, and µ2 = 0, hence q2 > 0.
Eliminating >.. from (A.22) and (A.23) yields: 
The L.H.S. is smaller than D., hence firm 2 will never produce anything if D. :::; 0. If
Do :::; 0, and L > Lmon, clearly firm 1 does not use all the permits. If L :::; Lmon, firm
l 's output is constrained by L/di . Suppose now Do >  0. If 0 :::; >.. < (c2 - ci)/(di - d2), 
clearly there is no solution for µi = µ2 = 0. It easy to see that then q2 = 0 and
qi = min{ qmon , L/ di } .  If >.. = ( c2 -ci)/( di - d2), Q is independent of L. This follows by
subtracting (A.22) from (A.23), but q1 decreases, q2 increases if L decreases. Obviously
there is L such that q2 = 0, qi = L/di and L such that qi = 0, q2 = L/d2, and qi > 0,
q2 > 0 for all L > L > L. For >.. > (c2 - ci)/(di - d2), clearly q1 must be zero and
q2 = L/d2 • Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6.2 Let 7j1 := qi (L), 7j2 := q2(L) be the solution of (6.3) and
let Q := 7li + 7h. Then
8II;(7Ji , 7l2) I - -) '(_)_ -0 = P (Q)qi + P(Q - ci 2'. P  Q Q + P(Q) - ci - >.di - µi qi 
(and strictly greater if qj > 0). The R.H.S. is a f.o.c. of the program (6.3) and equals
zero. Hence firm i is either a monopolist or it would like to increase output given the 
output qj > 0 of firm j.  Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6.1 We show (6. 11 ) .  (6. 10) is demonstrated in the same way by 
interchanging the indices 1 and 2. The proof works similar to the proof of Lemma 5.5. 
We will show that ()WPer 
oL (LD(o"f), o"f) > 0 ,
if firm 1 could be forbidden to produce. 
By definition of LD(s) we have for the r.s.d. at s = af: 8��0" (L, af) = 0. Since
qi (L) = 0, we get 0 = aw;·" (L, af) =
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Since Q(L) is constant on [L, L], we get q; (L) + q�(L) = Q'(L) = 0 on [L, L] , taking the
r.s.d. at L. Hence q}(L) = -q;(L). Moreover, d,q;(L) + d2q�(L) = E'(L) = 1 on [L, L] ,
taking the r.s.d. at L. Together this yields q}(L) = 1/(d1 - d2) and q2(L) = -1/(d1 - d2) .  
Hence (A.24) reduces to 
(A.25) 
On the other hand, forbidding firm 1 to produce and calculating the l.s.d. of wPer w.r.t.
L at ( L, af) we get
8WPer 
aL (L, af) = [P(q2(L)) - S, (L, af)d2 - c2]q�(L)
Plugging in (A.25) yields 
= [P(q2(L)) - d2 �: = �� - c2] q�(L)
1 
d [(d, - d2)P(q2(L)) - d,c2 + d2c,] q�(L)d, - 2 
Since d1 - d2 > 0 and qb(L) > 0, it remains to show that the term in brackets is positive.
But the f.o.c.s of the program ( 6.3) for L = L are 
P(q2) - c, - >.d, = 0
P(qz) + P1(q2)q2 - c2 - >.d2 = 0
Eliminating >. yields (d1 - d2)P(q2(L)) - d1c2 + d2c1 + P'(q2(L))q2(L) = 0. Since P' < 0,
the L.H.S. is smaller than (d1 - d2)P(q2(L)) - d1c2 + d2c1 . Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6.2 (6. 1 1 )  implies LM2 (af) > LD(af) = L and hence af < a�' 
since LM'(·) is decreasing (ifit is binding for firm 2). (6.10) implies LM' (af) > LD(af) =
L and hence a.f > a�1 since LM' (· ) is decreasing (if it is binding for firm 1). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6.3 case a) : O"mon ::; a.f, af1' < af. This case has almost
been proven in the text. For s ::;  O"mon, L(s) = LM1 (s) = Lmon· For s >  O"mon, LM1 , LM2
and LD are continuous and strictly decreasing. Further, q2(L) = 0, and q2(L) > 0 for 
L > L > L. Now, L = LD(a.f) = LM1 (a�' ) .  By Lemma 6 .1 ,  we get
for a.f ::; s < a.f +c:, if c: > 0 and not too large. Hence L( s) = L M, ( s) for a.f ::; s < a.f +c:.
On the other hand, q2 (LM' (s)) > 0 if s >  a�1 • Since a�1 < af, also q1 (LM1 (s)) > 0 if
s > a�' . But if both firms produce, LD(s) is optimal by definition. Hence 
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for af1 - c; < s ::;  af' , if c; > 0 and not too large. Since W(LM1 (s ) , s )  and W(LD(s) , s) 
are continuous, there must be a <Tint such that 
- M - D W(L 1 (aint), ain1) = W(L (aint) , aint) .
If we can show that Sint is unique, we cl�arly get L(s) = LM1 (s) for s ::; <Tint and
L(s) = LD(s) for <Tint < s ::;  af. To establish uniqueness of <Tint , it suffices to show that
the slope of W(LM1 (s), s) is steeper on [sf, sf1 ] then the slope of W(LD(s) , s) .  By the 
envelope theorem we get 
Since S21 (L, s) = S12(L, s) > 0 for L, s > 0, we are done if we can show that LM1 ( s) > 
LD(s) on the relevant domain. The f.o.c.s for LM1 (s) and LD(s) imply that
S1 (LM1 (s ) , s )  = 
p (L�:(•)) - Ct
(A.26) di 
S1(LD(s), s) C2 - Ct (A.27) - di - d2 
Since S11 ( L, s) > 0 for L, s > 0, LM1 ( s) > LD ( s) holds if the R.H.S. of ( A.26) is greater
than the R.H.S. of (A.27). But we know already by Lemma 6.1  that this holds for s = sf. 
The final step is to show that the R.H.S. of (A.26) increases in s. Since P' < 0 we have
to show that LM1 decreases. Differentiating (A.26) w.r.t. s yields 
= < 0 .
This establishes the behavior of L( s) for s ::; af.
For s =  af, we have LD(af) = L, hence q1 (L) = 0. For L < L firm 2 is a monopolist.
In the absence of firm 1, we had L(s) = LM' (s). By Lemma 6.2, however, and since 
LM2 ( s) is decreasing, we get LM2 ( s) > L for af ::; s < af + c; for appropriate c; .  Hence
firm 2 would operate if L( s) = LM2 ( s) and af ::; s < af + c;. But then, welfare could
be increased by decreasing L. Hence L( s) = L for af ::; s ::; a;-4' . For s > a;-4', we have 
LM2 (s)-> -L�4efini.tion ofat1' . Hence, L(s) = LM' (s) for s > at1' .
D M D - - D case b): amon > a2 , a2 1 2: a1 . If W(Lmon, amon) > W(L (amon), amon) we are
done, since then <Tint > <Tmon· If W(Lmon, <Tmon) ::;;, W(LD(amon) , amon) ,  it again suffices
to show that the slope of W(Lmon, s) is steeper than the slope of W(LD(s) , s) for s E
D - · D (s2 , <Tmon)· But dW(Lmon, s)/ds = -S2(Lmon , s) .  Smee Lmon > L (s) we are done by 
the same arguments in case a) . 
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case c): O"mon :'S O"f_, <7�1 :'.:'. <7f. In order to establish the unique existence of O"int E
{!?:f, <7�1 ) such that W(LM1 (<7int), O"int) = W(L�O"int) , O"int) or W(LM1 (<7int) , O"int) =
W(L, O"int) ,  we first have to show that the Ls.cl. f)WPer(L, <7�' )/8L is negative. Now,
- - M 8W(L, <72 ' )
{)L 
- 1 - - - M 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -- P(q1 (L)) [q1(L) + q/(L)] - S, (L, a2 ' ) [d,q,(L) + d2q2(L)] - c,q, (L) - c2q2 (L)
(- Mi ) C2 - C1 ( ) -S, L, a2 + d, _ d2 A.28 
since Q'(L) = 0, E'(L) = 1 and qr(L) = 1/(d1 - d2), q2(L) = -1/(d1 - d2) on [L, L] . 
On the other hand, taking the r.s.d. with respect to L at (L, a�' ) we get 
- - M -[P(q1 (L)) - S1 (L, a2 ' )d1 - c1Jqr(L) - 0 
Substituting (A.29) into (A.28) yields 
{)Hf Per (£, a�' )
{)L 
< 
P(q,(L)) - c, C2 - c, + --=---'-d, d, - d2 
P(q,(L)) - c, C2 - c, P'(q, (L))q, (L)--'�-'-!.--= + - = 0d, d, - d2 d, - d2 
(A.29) 
where the last equality again follows from the f.o.c.s of the program (6.3) for L = L. 
This establishes existence. 
To show uniqueness, we are done if W(LM1 (s�1 ) , s�1 ) :'.:'. W(LD(s�' ) , s�' ) since 
then <Yint :'S a�' . Suppose now the contrary. Again it suffices to show that the slope
of W(LM1 (s ) ,  s) is steeper than the slope of W(L, s) on the interval ( s�' , sf). But
dW(L, s)/ds = -S2(L, s) .  Since LM1 (s) > L for s < s�' and arguing as in case a) we
are done. 
The remaining arguments also work as in case a). 
case d): <Ymon > af, a�' < O"f. Combine the arguments from the previous cases.
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 6.4 Since O"int > <7f, we show that af > £. The proof for 
af > s works the same. Recall that Q is constant on [£, s] in social opti�um, call it
Q. Recall also that Q is constant on [L ,L] for the solution of (6.3), call it Q. In social
optimum the f.o.c.s at s = £ (taking r.s.d.'s) yield 
�D(Q) - S1 (d1Q,2)d1 - Ct = 0
P(Q) - S, (d,Q, 2)d2 - C2 = 0
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(A.30) 
(A.31) 
Eliminating P( Q) yields 
- C2 - Ct S1(d1Q,§.) = d d 1 - 2
The f.o.c. of the government's program for permits at s = o-f yields 
(A.32) 
(A.33) 
Since S12 > 0, it remains to show Q > Q. Eliminating S1 (d1Q,§.) from (A.30) and (A.31)
yields P(Q) = -<11z=��c' . Eliminating the Lagrange multiplier (which· -is the shadow
damage) in program (6.3) we get 
(A.34) 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 7.1 We know from Proposition 6.3 that the aggregate output 
Q under permits o� the interval [o-f, aj'12] equals q2(L) and from the proof of Proposition
6.4 we know that Q is determined by the first equation in (A.34). On the other hand, if 
the tax is rf, such that firm 1 just closes, the Nash equilibrium conditions yield 
P(q2(rf)) + P1(q2(rf))q2(rf) - C2 - rfd2 - 0 
P(q2(rf))  - c1 - rf di - 0 
Eliminating rf yields 
(A.35) 
Since d,�d, > 1 for d2 > 0, we get q2(rf) < Q = q2(L) by virtue of (A.34). Now, for 
s = sj'1' ,  and s = aj'1' , respectively, the f.o.c. for the government w.r.t. taxes, and
permits, respectively, are those of social optimum: 
(A.36) 
(A.37) 
�ince Q( s) is decreasing in s for social optimum if only firm 2 produces and since q2( rf) < 
Q, we get si"' > aj'1' . Q.E.D.
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Figure 1 :  The quantities in social optimum as a function ofs ifd1 (P----c2)-d2(P-c1 )  > 0. 
The solid line depicts aggregate output which equals q1 ( s) for s :::; §. and q2 ( s) for s <:: s. 
The dotted lines depict q1 and q2 for §. <  s < s. 
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Figure 2: The optimal linear taxrate as a function of s .  
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Figure 3: The solid line depicts the optimal number of permits as a function of s if /J. > O . 
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Figure 4: Aggregate quantities for the marketable output commodity. The solid line
depicts the social optimum, the "big dashed" line is for the permit solution, the dotted 
line for the tax solution, the "small dashed" line denotes "laissez faire" .  
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Figure 5: Aggregate emissions, solid line: social optimum, "big dashed" line: permits, 
dotted line: taxes, "small dashed" line: "laissez faire". 
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